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Draft Recommendation
the orsanisatio, 
"ik:::'::;i;:;:;:;i,'il,'l;:fr!i,:i::":t';;i::;,0 the Middte East
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait aggravated an already dif-
ficult situation in the Middle East which makes it urgent for Europe to take steps to promote a solution
to conflicts in the Middle East and the establishment of a peaceful, secure order throughout the Medi-
terranean basin and the Middle East with due respect for the cultural and religious traditions of each
people;
(i, Welcoming Arab initiatives to establish a regional security system and considering that a
reduction of tension requires co-operation between the countries of the region, respect for human
rights and the promotion of balanced economic and social development;
(iii) Considering that an international conference is needed in order to solve Middle East problems
on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and approving the intention expressed by the
European Council on 8th April l99l to have Europe play an active part in settling conflicts in the
Middle East;
(iv) Considering that the organisation of lasting peace requires immediate preparations to be made
for a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM) after the
fashion of the CSCE, duly adapted for application in the Mediterranean region;
(v) Considering that the limitation of arms supplies to countries in the region calls for international
agreement associating purchasing countries and selling countries in order to fix levels of armaments for
countries in the region;
(vi) Considering that the proliferation of all conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction,
in particular chemical weapons, in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East is a serious threat to
peace;
(vii) Gratified that WEU, after helping to apply the embargo imposed on Iraq as decided by the
Security Council, has taken responsibility for co-ordinating military action to assist Kurdish refugees
following the decision taken by the European Council on 8th April 1991,
RrcovvrNos rHAT rHr CouNctr-
I
With a view to helping to bring about peace in the Near and Middle East, should, where appro-
priate:
l. In all areas within its purview, pursue the action undertaken by the European Council to allow
Europe to help to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle East and security in the Mediter-
ranean, in particular by laying the foundations for a system of co-operation, good-neighbourliness,
co-responsibility and interdependence between all countries in the region with respect for human
rights;
2. Continue to implement European Council decisions relating to humanitarian aid to the Kurdish
people;
3. In all its activities, use the good offices of the Secretariat-General;
4. Instruct the WEU committee of chiefs of defence staff to:
(a) determine, if so requested by the countries concerned or decided by the United Nations
Security Council, the kind of military assistance member countries are able to make at the
present time in order to guarantee any peace agreements which may be reached in the
Middle East and organise the co-ordination of such assistance;
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(b) ensure an improvement in member countries' means of information, communication and
transport with a view to affording such assistance if necessary;
(c/ co-ordinate the use of military and other resources for the benefit of the Kurdish refugees;
5. Promote the achievement of a general agreement governing the possession of and trade in arms
in the Middle East and insist on transparency in the arms trade by having the United Nations record
contracts and sales;
6. Promote agreement between member countries to end or at least to reduce supplies of arms to
the Middle East with a view to making peace and stability possible;
7. To this end, invite the Institute for Security Studies to:
(a) sludy the ongoings of armaments of all kinds in the Middle East;
(b) gather information supplied to it by member countries on the armaments contracts they or
their private firms sign with countries in the region and on the possible transfer of tech-
nology that might be used to produce armaments and ensure compliance, wherever possible,
with end-user certificates;
(c) report back to the Assembly;
II
Help to prepare a conference on security and peace in the Mediterrranean and the Middle East
by instructing its Mediterranean Sub-Group to work out Western Europe's positions on all matters
relating to the first basket, in particular:
(a) the non-proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on the pro-
duction and holding of chemical and bacteriological weapons as a first step towards the cre-
ation of a zone free of atomic, biological and chemical weaponsl
(b/ controlling the arms trade;
(c) the limitation and verification of conventional armaments;
(d) conftdence-building measures;
(e) the creation of a conflict prevention centre;
III
Append to its annual report detailed information on the activities and conclusions of the Medi-
terranean Sub-Group and information obtained by the unit responsible for studying armaments in the
Middle East.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitled b1' Mr. Martinez, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The subject of the present report was
fixed many months ago. It corresponded to
global concerns relating to the application of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
However. threats to international peace and
Europe's security in regions close to the Medi-
terranean have growth in magnitude since
summer 1990 and it seemed reasonable for this
report to deal with them together with attempts
to solve them now that, in other parts of the
world. Europe's interests are Iess directly at
stake and its means of action more limited.
Your Rapporteur has therefore elected to limrt
his study to the Mediterranean region and the
Middle East, leaving the Political Committee
the possibility of studying the other aspects of
such a vast subject at a later date. The visit by
the Assembly's Presidential Committee to Egypt
on 29th and 30th April 1991, when it held
lengthy meetings with the highest authorities
of the Egyptian state, including President
Mubarak. allowed your Rapporteur to obtain
first-hand information on some important
aspects of his study.
2. Whereas developments in the Soviet
Union and the eastern part of Europe since 1989
have allowed the organisation of security in
Europe to be extended to cover the limitation of
armaments. economic and even technological
co-operation, the joint adoption of directives
governing the external relations of all countries
on this continent and even principles concerning
their internal r6gimes and their way of life, rela-
tions between Western Europe and its neigh-
bours to the south have encountered serious
problems, the gravity of whrch was illustrated by
the crisis unleashed by the Iraqr army's rnvasion
of Kuwait. Europe can no longer view rts
security solely in terms of the establishment of
peace on the continent of Europe; it must also
bear in mind that its relations with its southern
neighbours also concern its security and involve
risks which at first sight are probably not of a
military nature but affect its internal stability
and the conduct of its economy and. if allowed
to develop. might in the long run jeopardise
what now seems to have been acquired in terms
of peace.
3. Naturally, the countries of the southern
part of the European continent were more sen-
sitive than others to the deteriorating balances
in the Mediterranean region and from them
came most of the calls for a new international
order to be extended to that part of the world.
They did not always find the audience for their
concerns that they deserved among their
partners and one of the aims of the present
report should be to make Europe as a whole
aware of this situation. This seems particularly
necessary since the opening towards the East has
started to draw much of the interest of Euro-
peans in that direction, and in particular their
investment capability. There is every reason to
think that this attraction will gradually become
stronger, making those southern countries in
particular which benefit from European
assistance and capital fear that rf these means
are redirected their own development may
suffer. Thrs fear has been expressed particularly
forcefully by the Maghreb countries. Europeans
should certainly pay heed to thrs.
4. However, it must be noted that North-
South relations cannot be the same as East-West
relations. On the one hand, there are greater dif-
ferences between standards of living. mental-
ities, scales of social values and degrees of eco-
nomic development on the two shores of the
Mediterranean than there were, in spite of the
clash of official ideologies, on the two sides of
the former iron curtain. Furthermore, the
colonial era left an aftermath of mistrust. misun-
derstanding, psychological traumatism and
rejection which are far from having been
overcome and which concern the societies as a
whole. It is therefore far more difficult to reach
understanding on common values. Yet. particu-
larly in the economic area, there are more com-
plementary aspects that could give substance to
an understanding that conforms to the under-
standable interests ofboth sides. To a far greater
extent than in East-West relations. it is eco-
nomic convergences that should be exploited in
this case because they are the main area in
which it is possible to build up solidarity that
might then be extended to other sectors which
are more difficult for Europe to tackle immedi-
ately since it does not wish to be suspected of
trying to win back, in a different way. the
political, military, ideological and cultural posi-
tions that it once controlled through colonis-
ation. It is nevertheless clear that all the coun-
tries in the region have a common interest in the
establishment of a peaceful and secure order.
5. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to
examine first the fundamental aspects of a Med-
iterranean order, then the steps that might be
taken to organise such an order and, finally, the
possibilities available at a juncture still scored
by the aftermath of the intervention of northern
countries, under United Nations aegis. in the
Gulf conflict.
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IL Faclors of a Mediterranean order
(a) The region concerned
6. A first approach to the problem is to start
from a purely geographical basis: the Mediter-
ranean is an inland sea that. lor thousands of
years, has associated the peoples around its
shores in a common destiny: Phoenicians,
Greeks, Romans. Arabs, Franks, Normans, Byz-
antines. Turks, Spaniards and Venitians in turn
thronged all the shores of this sea, leaving traces
everywhere that have remained alive in peoples'
memories and present in their cultures. There
really is a Mediterranean area and one of its
characteristics is the contact of civilisations.
economies and cultures and the manifold
exchanges between the peoples round its
shores.
'l 
. However. in the course of history human
communities spread far from the banks of the
Mediterranean and no attempt should now be
made to cut them off. North of the Mediter-
ranean. they are essentially in Europe, where sol-
idanty. particularly economic. has in recent
years become crystallised round an economic
community whose boundaries might have to be
extended northwards and eastwards in future
years. Where the economy is concerned. it is no
longer possible to envisage a European policy
committing only some of its members. Hence it
is the community as a whole, as it now is or as it
is destined to become. that is concerned. South
of the Mediterranean, the Arab world is also a
community but of quite a different type; its
inhabitants are strongly aware of this, in spite of
the diversity of Arab societies and the divergent
interests of the states. A programme of
co-operation with Europe would be doomed to
failure if not open to the whole Arab world,
including non-Mediterranean countries such as
Mauritania, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.
The question may arise of the inclusion in this
group of countries such as Sudan. which is a
member of the Arab League, or Iran, which
belongs to another civilisation, is not a member
of the Arab League but is closely involved in all
Middle East affairs. It is naturally for those con-
cerned to say whether they wish to take part in a
Mediterranean order but they should not be
excluded automatically. This extension of Medi-
terranean co-operation has become more than
ever necessary following the Gulf war since it is
hard to see how countries like Israel and Syria
could be associated with it and not Jordan and
Iraq, or even Iran. without seeming to take a
course in the Middle East disturbances that
would prevent Europe being an acceptable
partner for the Arab nation.
8. Any European action to promote an order
of peace and security in the Mediterranean must
therefore be aimed at all the Arab countries and
also concern the rvhole of Europe. otherwise it
would look like an attempt to divide thc Arab
world and not be bascd on European realitics.
(b) Demographic aspects
9. While demography is rising rapidly
throughout the countries south of the Mediter-
ranean, the phenomenon is particularly striking
along the southern shore where the progress of
medicine and hygiene and an improved
standard ofliving have led to longer life expecta-
tions whereas the adjustments that occur in
industrialised countries have not yet had any
clear and lasting effect. The following tables
illustrate this better than lengthl'comments. For
each countr)', your Rapporteur has shown the
main demographic data followed by the most
important economic indicators, a few details
about the EEC's share tn their external trade and
figures showing the place of defence in their
economles.
10. These statistics show. on the one hand, a
very low per capita GDP in countries that do
not produce oil and, on the other hand. a growth
in the population which far exceeds the growth
in GDP, which means that the standard of living
of the people, alreadl' almost intolerable in
many cases, is destined to fall in future years,
and this could well lead to serious disturbances.
Disturbances have already occurred in some
countries, such as in Sudan and Lebanon.
resulting in a drop in GDP. This means that the
inhabitants of the southern shore of the Mediter-
ranean will inexorably be tempted to emigrate to
more favoured regions. be it the oil-producing
Middle East countries or Western Europe. There
have already been several million immigrants
from that region. There is every indication that
this flow of migrants will continue and accen-
tuate if swift economic development does not
soon provide employment for the population.
ll. In the last ten years, however, therc has
been a significant fall in the birth rate in the
Maghreb countnes, where thc average number
of children per woman fell, betwecn l9ll and
1988. by 350/o in Algeria, 2lo/o in Tunisia and
22o/o in Morocco, t.e. from 1.4. 5.5 and 5.9 to
4.8, 4 and 4.6. These ligures are still high com-
pared with a figure of less than 2 for Western
Europe and, if maintained. they would produce
a population of about 108 million for the three
countries as a whole by about 2025, compared
with 58 million in 1989, but it may be thought
that the trend recently indicated by demogra-
phers will be confirmed. The three countries
have family planning policies. inaugurated in
Tunisia in 1965. a little later in Morocco and
only in 1983 in Algeria. A particularly dis-
turbing case, however. is Egypt, where the popu-
lation is still increasing by 2.8o/o per year.
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Africa
Unrts Algerra Lrbya Morocco Tunrsra Egvpt Sudan
Population Mill. inhab.
o/o
years
24.6
3.1
62.5
4.4
3.7
60.'7
24.5
2.6
60.7
8
2.4
6 5.3
53
2.6
60.6
24.5
2.9
49.8
Annual growth
Life expectancy
GDP .
Annual growth average
I 980-88
1989.
Per capita
$ '000 million
o/o
o/o
$
60
J
2.8
2 273
23
-6
5 439
23.25
3.5
J
9s0
10.5
3.2
3.1
l3l5
33
5.6
5
640
I1.4
- 
1.3
-2
480
External debt ......
Energy production
Energy consumption
Imports
of which EEC . . .
Exnorts
M.$
M. ton coal
equiv.
M.$
o/o
M.$
o/o
25
124
3 3.3
8 6r0
59
8 813
62
3.3
75
l r.6
6 800
53
6 100
74
2l
I
7.8
5 r00
3 700
55
5.6
7.7
5
4 310
79
2 930
74
50
72.7
34
1 318
35
2 634
43
l3
0
1.5
l 400
3 3.5
450
30of which EEC
Defence budget as o/o of GDP
Troop levels .
o/o
Thousand men
1.9
l 38.5
6.8
85
5.2
192.5
5
38
9.8
378
6.9
73
Arabia
Units SaudrArabia Bahrain UAE Kuwait Oman Qatar Yemen
Population....
Annual growth.
Life expectancy
Mill. inhab.
o/o
years
t4.5
4
63.4
0.5
3.6
't0.7
r.6
J.J
70.7
2
4
72.8
t.4
3.3
55.4
0.3s
4.2
69.3
l0
3.2
50.8
GDP.
Annual growth average
I 980-88
1989.
Per capita
$ '000 million
o/o
o/o
$
78.4
-22
- 
0.7
5 433
3.2
z.)
2.5
6 513
26.1
- 
4.6
J
l6 882
23.15
t.7
1.5
ll 584
8
tt.7
6
s 657
- 
3.9
3
l5 288
6.7
2
4
600
External debt ..... .
Energy production
Energy consumption
Imports
of which EEC . . .
Exoorts
M.$
M. ton coal
equiv.
M.$
o/o
M.$
o/o
331
80
23 044
38.4
27 t20
21.6
I
9
7
2 800
t9
2 685
5
l9l r0 990
t32
27.5
l0 ll0
30.3
l5 610
5.7
250
99.6
t7
5 550
29
8 000
26.2
2 940
51.6
11.2
2 450
3l
3 930
l5
l5 288
27.6
7.2
r 300
36.8
l 610
8
,200
1.3
3.4
750
28
660
45
I
I
of which EEC
Defence budget
of GDP .. . ..
Trooplevels...
o/oAS
o/o
Thousand men
l 8.7
62
5
3.3
5.6
43
6.6
20
18.2
25.5
3.2
7
l3
64
6
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Asia Minor
Unrts Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon S1'na Iran Turkey
Population....
Annual growth .
Life expectancy
Mill. inhab.
o/o
years
r 8.28
3.5
63.9
4.5 |
1.6
7 5.4
4.1
3.9
66
2.9
2.1
61
t1.1
3.6
65
54.9
3.5
65.2
56.8
2
64.1
GDP.
Annual growth average
l 980-88
1989 .
Per capita
$ '000 million
o/o
o/o
$
34
8.1
l 950
38.4
3.2
I
8 650
4.65
2.3
2.3
I t34
95
- 
r4.4
321
2t.l
0.4
2
l 800
r67.3
1.3
-l
3 264
77.8
5.4
1.8
| 454
External debt ......
Energy production
Energy consumption
Imnorf s
M.$
M. ton coal
equiv.
M.$
o/o
M,$
o/o
85
151
12.5
l0 200
27.6
t4 200
26.1
26.3
0
12.2
13 000
51.1
10140
29.8
5.5
0
4
3 150
3t.2
I 400
9.3
0.5
0
3.7
2 460
46.1
709
29
5
l8
l1.5
2 076
36.3
2 658
30
5
186.4
65.9
9 535
39.4
t2 523
40.8
33.6
28
52
l4 800
4t.2
l0 650
43.7
of which EEC
Fxnnrtq
of which EEC
Defence budget
of GDP ... ..
Trooplevels...
o/oAS
o/o
Thousand men
28.6
l 000
13.4
t4L
l5
85 22
r 3.3
344
3
355
3.4
651
Immigrants from Mediterranean countfies in EEC countries
Turkey Algeria Morocco Tunrsia Yugoslavia Egvpt Others All non-EECMedit. countrres
B
DK
7 6.1
22.3
1481.3
30.2
0.2
t23.5
0.1
0.2
r67
r2
l0.l
0.3
5.5
0.6
796
0.6
2
126.1
2.1
5 5.8
35. l
431
2l
r30
5
5.9
0.1
24.3
1.4
0.2
r90
l5
2.6
4.6
9
597.6
0.9
0.3
64.5
l9
1.1
I t.1
6
11
0.4
l.l
7.9
3.1
10
0.2
222.8
3 3.8
2164.5
43.21
39.9
I 605
67
2
312
0.36
25
D.
GR
SP
F
IR
I..
L
NL
P
GB
Tnf cl t 9t4 815 806 239 715.5 4.2 2l 4 5t3.9
12. In the EEC countries. which have about
325 million inhabitants. there are now about 7.8
million foreigners (not including 5 million
nationals of other EEC countries), of which 4.6
million are nationals of third countries bor-
dering on the Mediterranean. It should be added
that, in certain countries receiving immi-
grants, foreigners who have been resident for a
number of years are not included in these sta-
tistics because they have been given the nation-
ality of the host country, although this does not
necessarily mean that they have been fully
assimilated. In any event, these countries cannot
open their doors unreservedly to immigration.
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There are only limited employment possibilrties
and the present economic contraction, accom-
panied in some cases by an increase in immr-
gratlon from Eastern European countries. means
that foreign nationals, often ill-adaptcd to the
needs of modern industrial society. cannot be
allowed to settle rvithout control. Even when
they are allowed to enter. they sometimes have
great difficultf in being assimilated and over-
coming the linguistic, economic and cultural
barriers separating the two shores of the Medi-
terranean. The protective measures that may be
taken b1' states on the northern shore will not be
enough to save them from the flow of immi-
grants. but they are already helping to deepen
the rift that is steadily opening between nations
to the north and south of the Mediterranean.
Onll' the development of the south can provide
a solution to this problem by oflering work and
a standard of living acceptable to its people.
Hou'ever. such development requires invest-
mcnt and guaranteed outlets for the production
of southern economles.
(c) Economic aspects
13. Where wealth and possibilities of
expansion are concerned, there is no homoge-
neit1, between countries. be they north or south
of the Mediterranean. Among the latter. some.
such as Kuu'ait. the Gulf Emirates and. to a
large extent. Saudi Arabia, have large oil
resources but very small populations. Others,
such as Iraq. Iran. Libya. Algeria or Egypt have
vast oil reserves and draw considerable benefit
from their exploitation but have to devote most
of these resources to developing their econ-
omies and people. Some have no large oil
resources nor. in general, enough natural
resources to compensate for the low income
thel' derive from industries which are not
developed enough for lack of capital and
properll'-trained staff. from insufficiently
modernised agriculture and from commercial
and tourist activities that are too rrregular and
srval'ed b1' changrng situatrons. The Iraqi war
further reduced the capabilities of Kuwait and
Iraq. The former was ruined, probably for
several years to come, by the destruction
rvrought by the Iraqr occupants, while the
latter. alread-v very much in debt following its
war against Iran from 1980 to 1988, placed
itself. because of its invasion of Kuwait. in a
situation from rvhich it will quite clearly be
unable to escape for a great many years. The
civil wars that followed these external wars
have further helped to ruin its economic
potential and the cohesion of its society.
14. Kuu,ait and Saudi Arabia have admittedly
organised financial assistance for the least privi-
Ieged Arab countries so as to remedy, to a
certain extent. inequalities due to the geo-
graphical location of oil resources. However,
these are merell, palliatives, however important,
srnce the OPEC countrles provrde 280/o of the
assistance to Mediterranean countries, but they
are quite out of proportron with true require-
ments and it may be wondered to what extent
such assistance will survive the 1990-91 crisis.
particularlf in the case of countries which did
not take part in the coalition. The United States
for its part supplies 310/o of the assistance to
these countries and the EEC l7%, which is rela-
tively little.
15. Although the countries on the northern
shore of the Mediterranean are in general better
placed, some of them, such as Albania, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia or even Greece or Turkey have a
GDP very much lower than that of the
industrialised Western European countries.
Mediterranean problems, even from an eco-
nomic standpoint, can therefore not be summed
up as a clash between wealthy countries in the
north and poor countries in the south but
involve complex relationships between countries
with varying resources that are very unequally
drstributed.
16. It should also be noted that the agricul-
tural economy and tourism play an important
part in the activities of those countries and that,
generally speaking. Mediterranean agriculture is
in no wal,complementary but, on the contrary,
competitive. particularly in the case of wine,
fruit. r'egetables and olives. The same is true of
tourism. In other words. the problems raised by
the Mediterranean economy cannot be solved in
a purely regional framework but require close
association between all European countries. in
particular the Community, which alone accounts
for almost 500/o of the trade of the Mediter-
ranean countries and 300/o of that of the Gulf.
17. The situation is very similar in regard
to the acceptance of workers lrom the most
densely-populated Mediterranean countries, who
can be taken in only by the most industrialised
European countries. There is a clear link
between the economrc problem and that of emi-
gration since expatriate labour is onc of the prin-
cipal resources of the poorest, most densely-
populated countries. In particular, it ensures a
constant flow of foreign currency. essential for
the equipment of those countries, thanks to the
regular remittance of part of wages to families
who remain in the home country. the payment
of allowances and pensions and capital brought
back by workers returning at the end of their
contracts. It cannot be denied that this aspect of
the exchanges between the trvo shores of the
Mediterranean has many disadvantages, partic-
ularl1' for those forced to emigrate. It would be
desirable in every respect if the development of
the southern countries provided enough
well-paid work for the whole population.
However. the economic and demographic data
shown in the tables suggest that such migration
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by workers will be necessary for a long time to
come. On the other hand, the aim of a Medlter-
ranean policy should be to limit its scale and
ensure the best possible conditions for those
concerned and for the economies of the coun-
tries on both shores of the Mediterranean.
(d) Contacts between civilisations
18. Although in ancient times there was
some degree of unity in the Mediterranean
world. thanks inter alia to the maritime activ-
ities of the Phoenicians and the Greeks and
then the rise of the Roman Empire. in the
middle ages this empire was divided and a large
part of the Mediterranean basin was conquered
by the Arabs and then the Turks. There ensued
many centuries of difficult relations between
Christian Europe and Moslem powers and only
in the aftermath of the second world war did
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire lead to the
establishment of the present states in the
Middle East, the last of them. Israel, havrng
been created only in 1941. In various ways. the
European powers continued to dominate the
southern Mediterranean countries until some
time between the second world war and 1962
and this did not facilitate the establishment of
harmonious relations between the peoples of
the Mediterranean basin.
19. Nowadays, opposite the states on the
northern shore, whose frontiers seem firmly
established and where Christianity has left a
strong imprint on a civilisation that is tending
increasingly to separate the political from the
religious, the major part of the southern shore is
occupied by' countries where the Arab language
and civilisation dominate and the Moslem
religion, to varying degrees, inspires social insti-
tutions and political practices. Only Israel and
Turkey, not to speak of Iran, do not consider
themselves Arab, while Egypt and Lebanon,
which are Arab, still have large Christian popu-
lations. The fate of Palestine and Lebanon show
how difficult multicultural and multireligious
cohabitation still is in the region, just as, to
the north of the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia's
national unity is jeopardised by the coexistence
of peoples with different cultural and religious
traditions.
20. The recent Kuwait crisis has just shown
once again the dilference between societies'con-
cepts of themselves north and south of the Medi-
terranean. Whereas in the north the national
state is the essential socio-political structure and
all wider forms of association are first based on
inter-state relations, in the south the feeling of
unity of Arab society is sttll very strong, thus
sometimes making it hard to grasp just who is
the true spokesman in international relations:
for instance. during the war against Iraq, even in
countries forming part of the coalition set up to
ensure respect for Security Council decisrons, a
large part of the population felt solidanty with
Iraq and its leader because they interpreted
events as a clash between part of the Arab nation
and the industrialised world.
21. The fact that the state does not play such a
decisive r61e in Arab society as in western
society is not necessarily an obstacle to struc-
turing international society south of the Medi-
terranean. It may. on the contrary, make it
easier, but any such organisation may follow a
course that is not necessarily the same as the
CSCE followed for Europe.
22. The r6le of lslam is still more difficult to
understand in view of the divisions that exist in
Moslem society, particularly between Shiites
and Sunnis but also between more or less
liberal or fundamentalist tendencies and of the
diversity of relations between states and
religion. The recent reactivation of Islam does
not necessarily mean victory for fundamentalist
theology. It is rather situations of need and
extreme underdevelopment that fuel despair -
the breeding ground for fundamentahsm.
However, there was some hesitation among the
people of certain non-Arab Moslem countries
during the Gulf war, particularly in Iran and
even Turkey, where appeals by Saddam
Hussein. leader of a party and president of a
state which nevertheless claim to be secular, for
Moslem solidarity in a war against the
unfaithful did not go unheeded, although
Turkey and Iran, for reasons of their own, were
on the side of the United Nations lrom the very
outset and throughout the crisis.
23. Thus. the foundation of states in the East
seems less sound than in the West. States are
factors of dissociation between an Arab nation
and a Moslem umma which existed before the
states did and for which the people are rather
nostalgic. In the West, associations of states
stem from a political will u'hich claims to be
based on reason. In the East, it is the com-
munity that seems the most deeply-rooted
element and the state the result of a political
will to adapt to local circumstances and a spe-
cific set of circumstances but which can be con-
stantly called in question: plans for unions once
put forward by Nasser and more recently by
Kadhafi. like the annexation of Kuwait by
Saddam Hussein. seem to derive from such a
concept of Arab and Moslem society. Nor can
one ignore the fact that most states in the
present Arab world inherited their frontiers
from a colonial past and they did not always
correspond to national realities. Civil wars in
Lebanon, struggles between Kurds and the Iraqi
authorities and unrest on other occasions in
Syria, Iranian Kurdistan and the Moroccan
Sahara show that many states. as they now
exist, group communities whose cohesion is in
no way guaranteed.
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24. These considerations imply that the
organisation of a Mediterranean security system
may not be pursued in exactly the same way as
the CSCE in Europe, where the homogenous
concept of the state and international society is,
in spite of the ideological clashes that dominated
Europe until 1989. far greater than in the Medi-
terranean area. In this case. account will have to
be taken of the reality of societies on the
southern shore and no attempt made to impose
on it specifically European political concepts.
The dialogue will not be easy and will mean all
concerned making conceptual efforts whose
importance must not be underestimated.
(e) Political aspects
25. The recent crisis that accompanied and
followed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait leaves a
strong imprint on relations between countries
north and south of the Mediterranean because
the situation the West thought it perceived did
not quite tally with the one actually experi-
enced, particularly in the Arab countries. The
West saw a dictatorial r6gime. unscrupulously
using barbarious means to maintain an internal
order that was contested by part of the popu-
lation. It procured excessively powerful arma-
ments, including weapons of mass destruction,
long-range missiles and sophisticated arms and
developed a policy of aggression, first against
Iran and then against Kuwait. The invasion of
Kuwait and its subsequent annexation, the
taking of thousands of western nationals as hos-
tages, the pillage of Kuwait, the installation of
the Iraqi army close to the Gulf oilfields, which
contain 600/o of known reserves, and the
ensuing threat for the world economy justified
very firm diplomatic action and the embargo
decided upon by the United Nations. Iraq's
downright refusal to negotiate and its attempts
to spread the conflict by appealing to Arab and
Moslem peoples to rally to its cause finally
resulted in the use of force to restore Kuwait's
sovereignty and enforce Security Council reso-
lutions.
26. It is not so easy to describe the reactions
of the governments and people of the southern
Mediterranean to this crisis. The govern-
ments of the Gulf countries undoubtedly felt
threatened by lraq, and this allowed the Arab
League to obtain a majority to condemn the
invasion of Kuwait and Egypt and Morocco, as
well as Syria, probably for reasons very much its
own, sent large forces to join those of Saudi
Arabia and the Emirates as part of the coalition
military effort. One might well be surprised by
the discretion of Libya's position and its rap-
prochement with Egypt which bore little resem-
blance to the image hitherto attributed to
Colonel Kadhafi's r6gime. Conversely, other
governments, such as those of Algeria, Jordan,
Tunisia and Yemen, plus the PLO, were, to say
the least, more hesitant about taking part and
expressed more or less firm reservations about
the coalition action. This was due to the way
their people reacted to the crisis: they had little
feeling about the infringement of international
law and the annexation of one Arab country by
another but saw the crisis as a brutal action by
rich and powerful northern countries to prevent
an attempt to unify the Arab world, to oppose
the revalorisation of Arab oil, to keep Arab
countries unarmed vis-d-vis Israel and to per-
petuate authoritarian, corrupt r6gimes in the
Arabian Peninsula. more concerned with the
particular interests of the elite in power than the
general interests of their people and the Arab
people as a whole. Some may view the military
crushing of Iraq as an outburst of northern
strength against a fraction of Arab and Moslem
society.
27. The question is not which of these two
interpretations is the most justified but of being
aware that the Gulf crisis crystallised opposing
factors that were of long standing and deep-
rooted. Although it may certainly be hoped that
the negotiations following the crisis will allow
more or less satisfactory solutions to be foundto outstanding questions such as the
Israeli-Arab conflict, Iraq's frontiers, the fate of
the Kurds and guarantees to be given to
Cyprus, Kuwait, Lebanon and Palestine, etc.,the international community must also
organise its remedy to those deeper problems
that affect all Mediterranean societies. This is
the aim of the proposal made by France, Italy,
Portugal and Spain for holding a conference on
security and co-operation in the Mediter-
ranean.
$ Military aspects
28. Political tension, on the one hand, the
wealth of certain oil-producing countries, on the
other, and, finally, the repercussions of the con-
frontation between eastern and western blocs
have for many years led to a real arms race in
the eastern Mediterranean. Israel's isolation in a
hostile Arab world has encouraged it, from the
very start of its existence, to devote a large pro-
portion of its budget and efforts to ensuring its
defence, but in so doing it raised fears among its
neighbours that it was developing an expan-
sionist policy of force and they too built up their
armaments. One country's armament leading to
that of the others, the build-up of arms in the
region has become a cause of economic
imbalance. fear and tension and it may be said
that Iraq's overarmament played a major r6le in
recent crises.
29. The industrialised countries contributed
very largely to overarmament in the region by
supplying weapons, often including the most
highly sophisticated, to many countries. This
l0
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was due primarily to economic considerations.
Important fluctuations in oil prices encouraged
them to restore their trade balance with the
Middle East countries by selling arms. Over-
bidding linked with the sophistication of
modern weapons also led industrialists to make
up for shrinking national markets by selling
abroad in order to remain in business. In many
cases, thel' turned a blind eye to their own coun-
tries' legislation in order to achieve commercial
results. Finally, concern to prevent certain coun-
tries dominating the entire region and to
maintain a balance of forces there helped to
direct arms sales. and particularly towards Iraq
when, in the early eighties. the Iranian Islamic
revolution made Iraq appear to be the rampart
of internatronal order vrs-d-vis risrng Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism. Following its
victory over Iran. anxietl' about Iraqi over-
armament induced some western countries to
arm Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. In 1988. the
Middle East imported about $ l8 000 million
worth of armaments. i.e. 380/o of the world total.
30. Most Middle East countries u'ere happy to
purchase weapons, but others have sought to
import equipment in order to be able to produce
them. Thus. after the 1967 war. Israel also
wished to become as independent as possible of
the good will of suppliers u'ho tried to bring
pressure to bear on it to encourage moderation.
Several Arab countries wished to develop a
nuclear weapons capabilitl'. since the non-
proliferation treaty precluded their procurement
32. These data must also be corrected, as
operations in the Gulf proved. by a coefficient
that it is impossible to calculate, i.e that of each
country's ability to make maximum use of its
weapons. Thrs coefficient is clearly much higher
abroad, and also chemrcal \\'eapons and missiles.
regarding which the exporting countries were
particularly restrictive. Iraq had u'orked out a
particularly elaborate policy' for obtaining. in
various countries. equipment and technology
that allowed the production on its territorl' of
chemical weapons and ballistrc missiles.
31. It is difficult to draw up an accurate
inl'entory of weapons now hcld by' countrtes on
the southern shore of the Mediterranean. but
certain facts seem certain:
(i) Israel seems to be the only country to
have operational nuclear weapons,
(ii) there is no doubt that Iraq produces
and has stocks of chemical weapons.
Egypt. Iran, lsrael and S1'ria also
have them. Everl,thing indicates that
Libya too is nou'producing them:
(lil) several countries have started to
produce missiles with a range of
several hundred kilometres thanks to
imported technology. r.e. Egy'pt. Iran.
Iraq, Israel. Libya. Saudi Arabia.
Sy'ria and Yemenl
(lr/ where conventional weapons are con-
cerned, the table hereafter gives a few
details of those held by countries in
the Gulf region. Thel' naturally
predate the Gulf war and figures
relating to Iraq must obviously be
revised sharpiy dou'nu'ards.
Forces of the principal military powers in the trIiddle East I
l. Table prepared on the basrs oldata grven in Thc Mrhtarl Balance 1990-91. publrshed b1 the International Instrtute lor
Securrty Studres rn London As a companson. rn Western Europe only the Fcdcral Repuhlrc has more than 5 000 tanks ltaly.
France and thc Unrted Krngdom harc onll 1531. I3.10 and 1300 respcctrvcly. Francc has 597 combat att'ct'aft. the United
Kingdorn 538. the Fcdcral Republrc 503. Itali'.12-s and Sparn 221. plus 838 tanks. The lcvcl of tblces rn thc EEC rs I37 mrlhon
comparcd u,ith 1.7 tbr the Arab East and 0..15 fbr the Maghrcb.
for Israel than for some Arab countries, but the
latter have made very raprd progress in mas-
tering military technology and they cannot be
expected to remain permanently below par in
this area.
ll
Countr) ForceIer els
Combat
arrcrafi
Battlc
tanks
Armoured
r eh rclcs
.\rtrllcrl'
p rcccs
Arnred
hclrcopters
Egvpt .
Iran . .
Iraq. .
Israel .
Jordan
Libya .
Saudi Arabia ........
Syria .
United Arab Emirates
450 000
504 000
r 000 000
14r 000
85 000
85 000
40 000
300 000
44 000
415
185
689
655
35
513
189
s58
9l
3 190
540
5 600
4 288
I r50
2 300
550
4 000
131
3 515
650
l0 000
6 300| 329
3 385
I 850
500
520
2
800
3 s00
r 395
458
I 110
444
2 000
l1
74
434
489
l5
I8
35
80
t45
l9
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33. In any event, the danger stems from the
strength of armaments held by countries whose
internal stability is not certain. whose frontiers
are contested and which have aggressive inten-
tions vis-ir-vis neighbouring countries. For com-
parative purposes, it may be noted that none of
the WEU countries had troop levels as high as
those of the Iraqi army and none could deploy as
many combat aircraft. tanks, armoured vehicles
or artillery pieces although, for helicopters, mis-
siles and the most sophisticated weapons. they
were in general better equipped. In such condi-
tions, it would be utopian to try to obtain a limit
on the level of armaments in those countries
without seeking to establish a peaceful order
throughout the region. Again, it would be
equally vain to try to establish such an order
without accompanying measures designed to
limit the arms race.
34. Mediterranean problems must therefore
be tackled from two separate angles: the set-
tlement of matters outstanding since the Gulf
war and the establishment of a peaceful order in
the region.
III. The proposed conference on security
and co-operation in the Mediterranean
35. The idea of trying to organise peace in the
Mediterranean to give it a more stable basis
dates back to the very origins of the conference
on security and co-operation in Europe since it
was proposed in 1972 by the then Italian Prime
Minister, Aldo Moro, and the CSCE has since
devoted part of its work to the Mediterranean.
However, the many regional conflicts that have
occurred in the Mediterranean basin have so far
precluded significant progress in this sense. For
instance. Israel and the Arab countries had to be
induced to meet around the same table. which
assumed a solution to problems with which
international diplomacy has been confronted
since 1941 . Nevertheless, the confrontation
caused in summer 1990 by Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait on the one hand showed the urgencl, of
making an effort to prevent further conflicts and
on the other hand. thanks to the massive
American military presence in the Middle East,
created new conditions that might open the way
to initiatives in this direction.
36. Italy and Spain prepared a proposal for a
conference on security and co-operation in the
Mediterranean and Middle East which France
and Portugal endorsed for submission at the
Palma meeting held in September 1990 in the
framework of the CSCE. This CSCM should,
according to the proposal, be an independent
entity although based on the principles set out in
the United Nations Charter and drawing upon
the experience of the CSCE, while realising that
the problems that will have to be solved in this
new context will olten be quite different from
those encountered by the CSCE. The conference
would also be wholly separate from any negotia-
tions or conferences that might be held to
restore peace in the Middle East following the
Gulf war. At its meeting on 8th April 1991, the
European Council, without formally adopting
the proposal, made a clear and positive ref-
erence to it in its final communiqu6.
37. There is no doubt that recent experience
with the CSCE inspired and provided grist for
the document presented by the four countries,
particularly their concern to associate security.
economic co-operation and the human
dimension of Mediterranean problems with a
view to drawing up a list of principles which
would be set out in a " Mediterranean act " spec-
ifying rules of conduct and coexistence that
countries in the region would agree to adopt,
adapting the CSCE experience to conditions spe-
cific to that region. This adaptation would not
affect the organisation of the conference's work
round three baskets: security. co-operation and
the human dimension. On this basis. the CSCM
might promote stability and understanding and
create bodies specifically designed to solve dis-
putes. As an accompanying structure. the CSCM
might, according to the authors of the doc-
ument, help to settle questions stemmrng from
the Gulf crisis or seek a solution to the Pales-
tinian problem.
38. The four powers' proposal defines the
aims of the CSCM as follows:
(r) to safeguard the securitv of all coun-
tries in the region and help to make it
globally more stable;
(ii) to promote balanced et'onornit' artd
social dereloptnenl in the region by
reducing economic, social. demo-
graphic, political and cultural imbal-
ANCCS;
(iii) to establish a framework within
which various civilisations might
coerist in peat'a,'
(iv) to establish a tnore peat't,/ill orderin the region based on solidarity,
replacing confrontation by co-oper-
ation;
(v) to lay the foundations of a s)'stetn
of good- nei g h bo u r I i n e ss, c'o- r e.s p ons i b i -
Irty and rnterdependerce between all
countries in the region,
(t'i) to ensure that the Mediterranean and
Middle East region plays an active
rdle within the new international
order that is to be established.
The aims of the CSCM might well also include
co-operation between the states round the shores
of the Mediterranean to combat pollution and
protect the environment in the region. The
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question of the rights of minorities should also
be included in the tasks of the conference.
39. The document sets out the criteriu on
which the conference should be based, stating
that the CSCM will adopt a global. progressive
approach.
(a) It will be global in its area, membership
and content:
(i) geographically. the CSCM will cover
the Mediterranean region in the
widest meaning of the word.
includrng the Middle East and the
Gulfl
(ir) the CSCM will be open to all coun-
tries in the region and to countries
having interests there:
(ur) the CSCM will deal with all matters
relating to co-operation and stabihty
in the region in accordance rvith a
st-stem of balance and compen-
sation.
(b) It will be progres.sit'c from the point of
view of choice of subjects and the dynamism of
the process. rvhich is extendable. The CSCM rvill
tackle these subjects bearing in mind their
degree of maturity and u'ill progress by stages,
opcning nerv channels of agreement as and rvhen
results are obtaincd.
40. Countries in the region and those with
interests there will be invited to take part. The
CSCM has political prospects which go beyond
the purely geographical side. It will therefore
take account ofthe need to include all countries
that might help to ensure co-operation and sta-
bility in the region. Consequently. all countries
in the Mediterranean basin. Middle East and
Gulf region '*'ill be invited to take part, plus the
European Community and its member coun-
tries. the United States and the Soviet Union.
Palestinians will be represented in an appro-
priate manner.
41. The proposal by the four porvers underlies
the idea that the practice of democracy and
respcct for human rights are essential conditions
for the stability and development of societies
and the efficiency of the public authorities. Sta-
bility. development and efficiency are obviously
compulsory factors in the organisation and
maintenance of peace, which means that the
three baskets grouping the aims of the CSCM
are closely interdependent.
42. The baskets will be defined as follows:
(a) The aim of the sct'ur itv basliet is to build a
stable order in the region. Thrs aim will be
attained b1' tackling the underlying causes of
insecurrty and at the same time placing limits on
the most destabilising effects of militarl' compe-
tition. The underlying causes of instability are
mainly economic, social and political. The pro-
liferation of arms of mass destruction has a par-
ticularly destabilising effect.
To ensure stability in the region. prioritl'
should first be given to the geographical
dimension of the problem, especially in South-
South relations. As a start a number of prelim-
inary. voluntary confidence-building measures
should be taken (Mediterranean confidence-
building measures) as rvell as political measures
aimed at controlling the prolrferation of
weapons o[ mass destruction.
(b) The co-oparation basket is essential if the
CSCM is to attain its aims. Its fundamental
purpose is to promote co-development. nec-
essary for tackling economic and demographic
imbalances in the region. Without replacing
other bi- or multilateral bodies. this basket will
aim to achieve a synthesis of all forms of
co-operation, establish economic and financial
solidarity. develop existing instruments' above
all in the framework of the EEC's Mediterranean
policy, strengthen the process of regional inte-
gratlon and respond to the expectations of the
peoples.
(c) The hurnan tlimensiort basket will aim to
bring the peoples of the region closer together.
Such an aim would be pursued in a tu'o-
fold direction: first. the establishment of a
framework of coexistence through dialogue, tol-
erance and understanding between societies'
civilisations and creeds and. second. the defi-
nition of a common approach to human rights.
both in theory and in practice.
43. The time-table for thrs programme rvill
take account of the ambitious, complex nature
of a CSCM initiative. Its preliminary/ stage
would be informal and should go as far as pos-
sible. The formal stage. which would be opened
by the meeting of a preparatory committee,
would start as soon as there was a sufficient con-
sensus. At the same time, prospects that the
CSCM might offer for the luture of the region
would be stressed in an appropriate manner.
44. A l[etlitcrranaan platform would be based
on the idea that the Mediterranean region is an
area of great diversity. In order to establish an
initial common denominator and ensure a suffi-
cient degree of convergence, all countries
wishing to join the CSCM would be invited to
form part of the process by first subscribing to a
series of fundamental principles, or " Mediter-
ranean platform ", as an expression of their
determination and contmitment.
45. These principles would include:
(il territorial integrity, the inviolabilitl'
of frontiers. renunciation of the use
of force and peaceful settlement of
disputes;
l3
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(ii) co-development and economic and
financial solidarityl
(llr) tolerance, coexistence and mutual
understanding between civilisations.
46. This proposal obviousll, takes account
of what has been acquired in the CSCE and the
specifically Mediterranean dimensions. Its
implementation is clearly aimed at establishing
a new Mediterranean order based on the same
principles as the order created in Europe by the
CSCE, but it does not overlook the special diffi-
culties stemming from many differences over
frontiers, non-recognition of Israel by many
Arab countries and the refusal of a large section
of Islamic society to accept western. rationalist
concepts of human rights. It is particularly
vague on this last point. The effort the countries
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean will
be required to make in order to accept the prin-
ciples on which the new Mediterranean order
might be based will be far greater than the one
required of the countries on the northern shore,
especrally as the latter have already subcribed to
such principles under the 1975 Helsinki final act
and the 1990 Paris Charter. Coherent, prolonged
diplomatic action will certainly have to be
taken to rally the support of those in the south.
47. The West is not without arguments to
encourage this. On the one hand. it provides a
number of guarantees for migrant workers
moving from the southern to the northern shore.
Again, and above all, the proposed economic
co-operation will operate mainly in favour of the
southern countries. This is already well under
way, particularly in the framework of the
European Community and its Mediterranean
policy. For instance, in February l99l, the
Twelve agreed to renew for the third time the
financial protocols governing their relations
with eight countries on the southern shore for
the period lst November l99l to 3lst October
1996. They accepted the Commission's pro-
posals by increasing substantially the subsidies
and loans to these countries in the previous
five-year period and by making available under
the Mediterranean policy for this new period a
total of 4 405 million ecus of subsidies and loans
by the European Investment Bank to Eg.vpt,
Morocco, Algeria. Tunisia. Syria. Jordan. Israel
and Lebanon, in the order of the size of the sums
granted. This was an important gesture because
of its magnitude for the benefit of the most
densely-populated countries whrch are the least
privileged by their natural resources and this
illustrates the importance the European Com-
munity attaches to the Mediterranean dimen-
sion of its policy. It is in addition to bilateral
action by certain states, whether or not members
of the Community, and in particular the United
States, which grants considerable assistance to
certain countries in the region such as Egypt,
which receives $2 300 million each vear.
Moreover. on the occasion of the Gulf crisis.
President Bush proposed to Congress that
Egypt's military debt (believed to be about
$7 000 million) to the United States be can-
celled. The European Community for its part
has undertaken to give $ I 500 million to Egypt,
Jordan and Turkey to compensate for losses due
to the Gulf crisis, this sum being shared between
the Community budget and contributions from
member states. not forgetting emergency food
assistance to certain countries such as Egypt, the
occupied territories, Sudan or countries directly
affected by the Gulf war and its sequels. Fur-
thermore, several European countries have
granted unilateral assistance to these countries,
in particular by wnting off all or part of their
debts. For instance, this is what Spain has done
for Egypt.
48. All these measures show clearly that, with
the CSCM proposal, the purpose is not for
Western Europe to embark upon a new policy
but to give greater coherence to a policy that is
already under way by trying, in exchange for
increased economic co-operation with the
southern Mediterranean countries. to improve
the application of the principles on which the
evolution of states towards democracy and the
organisation of a more stable peace might be
based to the greater benefit of the peoples in the
regron.
49. Nevertheless, the traumatism caused in
many Arab countries by the Gulf crisis and its
sequels will not make it easy for those countries
to embark upon preparations for such a con-
ference. They will be able to do so only progres-
sively insofar as their national problems are
solved, moreover, and particularly the question
of the fate of the Palestinians. The success of the
CSCM. whose aim would not be to solve current
conflicts but far more to ward off recourse to
force and establish a new peaceful order for the
long term. therefore very largely depends on
solutions being found to outstanding questrons,
particularly those stemming from the war with
Iraq.
50. Clearly, WEU's own rOIe in the estab-
lishment of the CSCM arrangements relates
mainly to the first basket, security, but its r6le
will be crucial here because WEU is the
instrument by which Europe can define joint
positions:
(a) on the non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. particularly
chemical weapons. which form a large
part of the military arsenal of several
countries in the region. It should be
recalled that in Recommendation 475
the Assembly had already called for a
freeze on chemical weapons in the
Middle Eastl
(b) on suppfies of conventional weapons.
Several proposals have been made to
t4
DOCLINlENT I27I
the European Council for regulating
the sale ol arms to the region, particu-
larly' at its meeting on 8th April 1991.
The Tu'elve or the Nine can obviously
not on their ow'n pass legrslation on
the arms trade with countries in the
region. The proposal adopted by the
Twelve to ask the United Nations to
open a register to record the declara-
tions of member countries regarding
their arms sales u'ould introduce. if
followed up, slightll' more openness
into the arms trade. but would not be
enough to solve the problem. It would
also be difficult to accept an agree-
ment solell, between arms-exporting
countries fixing the level of arma-
ments authortsed for the other coun-
tries. The aim of the CSCM in this
area should be to seek agreement
betwecn exporting and importing
countries to fix ceilings on armaments
for each countr) in the region. thus
making.it possible to limit sales of
arms rn accordance w ith such
ceilings;
(c) on the verification of agreements lim-
iting arms of all kinds;
(d) on confidence-building measures,
including the announcement of mil-
itary manceuvres and the access of
observers to such manceuvres.
Although according to the four-
country proposal these measures
should remain voluntary. rt would be
useful for the WEU countries to study
them together so as to agree on con-
crete proposals to be addressed to
countries taking part in the con-
ference.
51. At the plan's present preliminary stage,
WEU can onll' make preparator)' studies of
these four points. However. the Council's Medi-
terranean Sub-Group provides a framework in
which such studies might and should be started.
There is every reason to fear that the scanty
information the Council gives the Assembll' on
the work of this sub-group conceals the slim
volume of its work. Your Rapporteur therefore
proposes that the sub-group be set the task of
preparing everything relating to the first basket
of the CSCM. u'hich seems to conform rvith
what has already been started. judging bf'
Chapter VII of the annual report of the Council
on its activities in 1990.
IY. The sequels of the Gulf war
52. There was a real concert of indignation in
the media at Europe's absence from the opera-
tions carried out against Iraq as from 2nd
August 1990. This view seems singularll' partial
if the crisis is considered as a whole: from thc
very outset, political co-operation defined a
European policy based on respect lbr Securitl'
Council decisions and partrcipation in imple-
menting them and on reliance on the Arab coun-
tries to settle the conflict. WEU lbr its part
co-ordinated naval action by member countrles
in the Gulf. ri'hich allou'ed several countries,
which would not, on their ou'n. have had the
essential means of logistic support. to take part
in the operations. This action was most
important in the question of enforcing the
embargo. since about two-thirds of the controls
effected uere carried out by ships from WEU
countries. The embargo had thc effects that
might have been expected: it uas intended to
shou' that the international community w'as not
prepared to tolerate the annexation of Kuwait
and to convince Saddam Hussetn that he should
adopt a more reasonable attitude. He could not
be forced to capitulate very quickly by this
means alone.
53. The political commitment of Europe. or
of European countries, was. from the outset.
complementary to that of the .{mericans.
Admittedly. it did not have enough forces
capable of intervenrng a long wa1' from Europe
to be able to balance American strength. Finally.
the United Kingdom and France made a major
contribution. The participation of three other
WEU countries in air operations. naral action to
enforce the embargo and the logistic support
afforded b1' Spain showed that, even if it might
have been thought desirable for Europe to play a
larger rOle. it was not absent during the crisis. Its
rdle was neither insignificant nor ridiculous as
has too often been claimed. It rvas certainly a
secondary one and we must drau the political
consequences.
54. When the operations came to an end. the
situation changed again. The naval blockade rvas
continued. helprng to kcep pressure on the Iraqi
Government. compelling it to accept most of the
conditions for a return to peace set out in
Security Council Resolution 687 of 3rd Apnl
1991. Above all. however, twelve-power
political co-operation reacted strongll' to the
Iraqi Government's repression of the Kurds
before the United States Government. and
member countries plal'ed a major rdle. first in
the adoption of Resolution 688 on 8th April
which, for the first time. condemned a country
for a policy of repression pursued within its own
frontiers and, second. in the steps taken to
contain the Iraqt army's repressive operations in
Kurdish territorl'. The same day. the European
Council voted in favour of setting up a safe
haven for the Kurds on lraqi territorl' under
United Nations control. Action was then taken
on this initiative.
55. This is the context in which three WEU
meetings should be set: that of the Ministers.
held in Luxembourg on 8th April on the
occasion of the meeting of the European Council
t5
DOCUMENT I27I
at the level of heads of state or of government,
that of an ad hoc group in Paris on 9th April and
that of the chiefs of defence staff on lOth April.
The latter had been planned some time before
but its agenda was considerably modified to take
account of the new questions that had arisen.
The first two meetings were decided at very
short notice, at the request of the French
Chairmanship-in-Offi ce.
56. The latter doubtless had a twofold aim: to
solve an immediate problem, r.e how to bring
assistance to the Kurdish refugees, and to show
in practice how WEU could operate in the
framework of the European Council in
accordance with several proposals presented at
the twelve-power intergovernmental conference.
It was in fact in the framework of the European
Council of heads of state or of government of
the Twelve that the political decision was taken
to come to the help of the Kurds. It is the Com-
munity that was instructed to organise the nec-
essary funds and goods. The WEU Council was
set the task of co-ordinating the logistic aspects
because they implied the use of military aircraft.
It is to be regretted, however, that the concern of
certain countries to organise their participationin affording humanitarian assistance to the
Kurds under their national flag limited the prac-
tical impact of these initiatives.
57. Another aspect of co-operation between
WEU and the European Council was the invi-
tation to Denmark, Greece and Ireland to attend
the WEU ministerial meeting as observers.
Turkey was also invited to send its ambassador
as an observer. Denmark, Greece and Turkey
have apparently accepted the invitation. Ireland
was reported to have turned it down but, since
the nature of the task did not jeopardise its neu-
trality, it is believed to have decided to take part
in implementing the decisions, which would be
the first time this country has taken part in a
WEU activity.
58. No information has been released about
the meeting of the ad hoc group but the chiefs of
defence staff of the WEU member states issued a
communiqu6 at the close of their meeting on
lOth April in which they specified that: " On
that occasion, the chiefs of defence staff also
held the necessary preliminary consultations on
the military aspects of the WEU countries' con-
tributions to the implementation of Security
Council Resolutions 687 and 688. " In other
words, like the Ministers on the 8th, they dis-
cussed not only assistance to the Kurds but also
the conditions for restoring peace with Iraq.
59. The communiqu6 also says " the meeting
allowed the chiefs of defence staff to hold an
informal exchange of views on the development
of European military co-operation, particularly
in the light of lessons learned from the lraqi
conflict ", which was their initial task, and gave
the following detail: " The Secretary-General of
WEU, Mr. Willem van Eekelen. also took part in
the meeting " whereas, as far as your Rapporteur
knows. he did not attend the ministerial
meeting.
60. All this information suggests that, together
with twelve-power political co-operation, the
WEU Council is now directly involved in
Middle East affairs. at least where the imme-
diate consequences of the conflict with Iraq are
concerned. and that it will be involved in other
aspects of regional matters as soon as the
question arises of the intervention of armed
forces of member countries. which may be the
case for settling several of these matters.
61. The end of the war between the coalition
and Iraq was the subject of Security Council
Resolution 687, adopted on 3rd April l99l by
1l votes to I (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Equador
and Yemen). The main points may be summed
up as follows:
(a) the frontiers fixed in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
agreement of 4th October 1963 will be
re-established. marked out with the
assistance of the United Nations Sec-
retary-General and declared invio-
lable. and a demilitarised zone will be
established on each side of these fron-
tiers under the control of a group of
United Nations observers before the
withdrawal of coalition forces from
Iraqi territory;
(b) all chemical and biological weapons
and all ballistic missiles with a range
of more than 150 km held by Iraq will
be declared, verified by the United
Nations and destroyed within forty-
five days. Iraq will undertake to
produce no more such weapons. The
application of the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons of
I st July 1968 will, in the same way, be
reaffirmed and verified by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Para-
graph l4 adds " that the actions to be
taken by Iraq represent steps
towards the goal of establishing in the
Middle East a zone free from weapons
of mass destruction and all missiles
for their delivery and the objective of
a global ban on chemical weapons ".
thus linking the end of the conflict
with Iraq with the planned organi-
sation of a new order of peace and
security in the Middle East, as pro-
vided for in the proposed CSCM;
(c) all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq
will be returned and Iraq will be
" liable ... for any direct loss. damage.
including environmental damage and
the depletion of natural resources "
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that occurred durrng the conflict.
Moreover, the Securitl' Council
" demands that Iraq adhcre scrupu-
lousll' to all of its obligations con-
cerning servicing and repal'ment of its
foreign debt ". Under the supervision
of the United Nations Secretary-
General. a fund rvill bc established
u,ithin thirty days to pay compen-
sation to victims of the lraqi
aggression. One may u'onder whether
Iraq will be able to meet such commit-
ments. even if a percentage of its oil
profits are levied at thc source:
all the measures of the embargo on
basic products or goods supplied to
Iraq wrll cease immediately in the case
of foodstuffs and essential goods. The
list of products still under embargo will
be revised cvery two months. These
measures will be lifted as soon as the
Security Council notes Iraq's effective
application of the preceding provi-
slons,
the sale to Iraq of arms. equipment or
technology that might be used to
produce them, and the sending of staff
u'ho might help in the production of
arms will still be prohibited. even if
provided for under earlier agreements,
and this without any financial or other
compensation. This decision may be
revised within three months onlf in
the case of conventional weapons;
Iraq will co-operate with the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross for
the repatriation of foreign citizens
who were in Iraq on 2nd August 1990:
Iraq will undertake not to resort to ter-
rorism and u'ill forbid its territory to
any terrorist organisation:
the cease-fire will come into force as
soon as Iraq has subscribed to these
commitments;
the Securitl' Council " decides to
remain seized of the matter and to
take such further steps as may be
required for the implementation of
the present resolution and to secure
peace and security in the area ".
62. Resolution 688. adopted on 7th April.
condemns the methods used by Iraq to repress
the internal rebellions that followed the return
to peace and provides for humanitarian aid to
the Kurdish refugees on Iraqi territory. This
decision takes account of the ban notified by
General Schrvarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of
coalition forces, to the Iraqi authorities con-
cerning flights by military aircraft and attacks
on coalition aircraft carrf ing out this humani-
tarian operation but does not take account of
Iraq's opposition to any further foreign inter-
vention on its territory. In fact. Iraq seems to
have resigned itself to alloriing the application
of measures that it could not seriously oppose.
63. Thus. Resolution 687 launches action that
already goes further than the conflict betu'een
Iraq and Kurvait since it refers to the creation in
the Middle East of a zone free of rveapons of
mass destruction. Furthermore. to shou' their
coherent approach, the allies have undertaken.
during the period of tension. to try to call a
general conference on soh'ing Middle East
problems with a view to settling them on the
basis of United Nations resolutions. In fact, it
seems doubtful whether such a conference can
be held at all soon and Amelican diplomacf is
trying rather to settle cach of the outstanding
questions separately. In an1' etent. it ma-v be
considered positive that this diplomatic
approach is showing particular determination in
trying to induce Israel to negotrate on the future
of the occupied territories.
64. It is essential for Europe to be present
when an attempt is made to settle these various
questions because this is a region where it has
considerable interests and. above all, because its
partrcipation is keenly desired by' several of the
countries directly concerned. The Presidential
Committee received confirmation of this from
the highest Egyptian authorities during rts visit
to Cairo on 29th and 30th April.
65. The most important of these questions is
a settlement of relations between Israel and its
neighbours on the one hand and the Palestinians
on the other. Following approaches by the
United States Government. the Israeli Gov-
ernment seems to have accepted the idea of sep-
arate negotiations with each of rts nerghbours.
However. it is not yet clear on u'hat bases such
an agreement might be concluded in respect of
four essential matters:
(i) the Golan Heights. annexed unilat-
erally by Israell
(iil Jerusalem. the eastern part of rvhtch
was also annexed by Israel;
(iii) the fringe of Lebanese territorl'
occupied by Israel for security-related
reasons:
(lrJ relations between the West Bank and
Jordan, Iinked with the even more
delicate question of the status of the
West Bank.
66. The opening of negotiations betrveen
Israel and the Palestinians, the principle of
which Israel now seems to accept. runs into par-
ticular difficulties:
(i) With whom Israel would agree to nego-
tiate. since it refuses to negotiate u'ith the PLO?
((l)
(e)
(.t)
(s)
(h)
(i)
t7
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The United States authorities believe the latter
has the disadvantage of having backed Saddam
Hussein during the conflrct. It nevertheless
enjoys the support of a large, but impossible to
measure, proportion of the Palestinians, which
makes it impossible to leave it right out of the
negotiations. The Shamir plan presented by
Israel calls for the negotiators to be appointed in
elections in which Palestinians still living in the
occupied territories would take part, but not
those living in East Jerusalem, considered to
have been annexed by Israel, and those who
have been expelled by the Israeli authorities.
This limitation of the electorate. which pre-judges the result of a future negotiation and
excludes many people because of their political
activities. would seem to be difficult for the Pal-
estinians to accept.
(ii) The future status of Arab Palestine and
the nature of its relationship with Israel on the
one hand and Jordan on the other since Israel
considers it essential for the negotiations to be
held on the basis of prior agreement leaving it at
least military control over the West Bank.
(iii) Jewish settlements in the West Bank and
Golan Heights which are continuing in spite of
warnings from the international community and
in particular Europe and the United States.
61. It should be noted that Europe has not
adopted identical positions to those of the
United States on these various matters but, not
having the necessary means of its own to give a
credible guarantee of Israel's security, it carries
far less weight than the United States since the
latter forced Iraq to evacuate Kuwait. Never-
theless, there is no doubt that, if Europe insisted
on using WEU to act in the East, it was to show
that its action was not to be confused with that
of the United States. Unlike the latter. the
Twelve did not terminate their recognition of
the PLO as being representative or the
assistance they granted Jordan in retaliation to
the accommodating attitude of that organisation
and that state towards Iraq during the crisis.
However, the idea that " no solution must be
excluded, including the creation of a Palestinian
state ", contained in the text handed to jour-
nalists at the close of the European Council
meeting on 8th April was eliminated from the
final text distributed on the 9th. which indicates
that there is, to say the least, some hesitation
among the Twelve.
68. At its meeting on 8th April 1991, the
European Council, while paying tribute to
efforts made by the United States and hoping it
would be successful, called on " the foreign min-
sters to pursue their consultations with all the
parties directly concerned in the region and
other interested states, particularly the United
States and the USSR. in order to contribute to
the definition " of the principles on which peace
might be restored by means of " one or several
peace conferences, under an impartial aegis. to
provide assurances and the necessary guarantees
from the international community. As an
important actor in the Mediterranean, the
European Community should also be associated
with this process ". This means that it must be
prepared to play an active part in guaranteeing
possible peace agreements, with the military
consequences this may imply.
69. The European Council also reaffirmed its
support for the implementation, for Lebanon, of
the Taif Agreement which allows free elections
to be organised quickly, a start to be made with
rebuilding the country, the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and an end to Syria's expansionist
designs in this direction. Where Cyprus is con-
cerned, it supported efforts by the United
Nations Secretary-General to enable Cyprus to
recover its unity and sovereignty, trusting that
these efforts, with the support of a resumed dia-
logue between the two parties, would soon come
to a successful conclusionr.
10. However, on 8th April the European
Council went further in regard to the re-
establishment of security in the Middle East.
Recognising that it was first for the states in the
region to decide their own security arrange-
ments, it announced its support for the eight
Arab countries in the coalition to create a first
security nucleus, but recommended that they
extend this circle to other states in the region
and announced that certain member states of
the Community were prepared to take part in
security undertakings if the states in the region
so wished 
- 
this is likely to involve WEU.
71. Above all, the European Council agreed
measures to stop the arms race in the region and
to this end:
(i) to strive with determination to
strengthen systems for the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and first and foremost
chemical weapons.
(ii) to promote the prevention of the
build-up of conventional weapons
while bearing in mind the legitimate
and reasonable defence needs of
countries in the region;
(iii) to ask the ministers for foreign affairs
to make proposals with a view to a
multilateral dialogue on this subject
and to specify the Twelve's own
contribution to non-proliferation
systems;
(iv) to propose using experience acquired
by the Twelve in the framework of the
2. The last phrase, whrch was rncluded rn the text released at
the press conference of the Charrman-rn-Office of the
European Councrl, Mr. Jacques Santer. on 8th Apnl. was
elmrnated from the final text pubhshed on the 9th.
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CSCE to establish confidence-
building measures and openness in
military activities such as:
- 
the creation of a conflict pre-
vention centre;
- 
the establishment of a communica-
tions network;
- 
notification of certain military
activities;
(r/ to introduce a system of openness in
the sale of arms by suPPorting, in
New York, the working group set up
by the United Nations to establish a
United Nations arms register. Such
openness is clearly aimed at reducing
and limiting the sale of arms and one
may wonder if it does not run counter
to the policy of large sales of arms,
which the United States has just
started. to a number of Middle East
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia,
since the return to peace in the Gulf.
According to information in the
press, the figure for a first series of
contracts is worth $33 000 million.
Such 
.a policy would seriously. com-promise European proposals to
establish a new order of peace in the
Mediterranean and hence in the
world. These proposals do not seem
to be attracting much attention in the
United States Government.
72. It will be noted that the application of
such measures in such a sensitive region as the
Middle East would be an important step towards
establishing this order which is necessary if a
conference on security and co-operation in the
Mediterranean is to meet to any useful purpose.
It also implies co-ordinating member countries'
military action in many sectors that cannot yet
be clearly defined because the prior agreement
of the countries in the region is essential but
which only WEU can ensure by associating non-
member countries if necessary, as it did for the
application of Security Council resolutions
against Iraq during the crisis and in favour of
the Kurdish refugees in April.
V. Conclusions
73. The crisis throughout the Middle East
since summer 1990 quite obviously disturbed to
some extent relations between the countries
north and south of the Mediterranean. If Europe
does not take the necessary steps to lay new
foundations for peace and security throughout
the Mediterranean area. it is liable to start a
period of instability and tension on a fearful
scale.
74. However, the coalition victory over Iraq
created a new situation which, with strong
chances of success. allows the initiative to be
taken, if not for a global settlement, at least for
negotiations allowing a solution to be found to
most of the problems that have disturbed peace
in the Mediterranean in recent decades. Faced
with lraq's aggression agarnst Kuwait, the inter-
national community showed that it was pre-
pared to act to restore order in accordance with
law and with the support of the United Nations.
Europe can and must be in a position to give its
guarantee to the agreements it has signed.
Moreover, in view of the rOle it played in the
crisis, it can play an important part in the nego-
tiations that are starting because it has had con-
nections with the countries south of the Medi-
terranean for centuries and is more aware of
some aspects of their problems. Many countries
to the south therefore wish it to intervene. It will
no doubt have to play an active part in estab-
lishing a new order, inter alia, if the countries
directly concerned so wish, by deploying armed
forces in the region to guarantee frontiers and
keep the peace.
75. Furthermore, the proposal to organise a
conference on peace and security in the Mediter-
ranean must take advantage of these circum-
stances and the settlement of the conflict makes
it urgent to take steps to restore mutual confi-
dence, develop exchanges and co-operation and
set peace on new bases. European diplomacy
must move on from the stage of restoring peace
to that of preparing for a new collective security
system in accordance with the plan of which the
European Council sketched the broad lines on
8th April 1991.
16. Finally, for Europe itself the Gulf crisis
accelerated and stimulated thinking that had
been only too slow about the organisation of the
security of twelve-power Europe. There was
indeed quite remarkable coherence between the
work started after the Rome summit meeting in
December 1990 by the intergovernmental con-
ference on political co-operation and the action
taken by European political co-operation, on the
one hand, and that of the WEU Council, on the
other. The respective r6les of the European
Council, political co-operation and WEU
emerged from actual facts before being defined
by the intergovernmental conference. WEU was
clearly seen to be the flexible instrument for
European security co-operation, capable of
bringing in non-member countries to handle
specific questions and co-ordinating the action
of European countries which had decided to
intervene to follow up European Council deci-
sions either, by a naval deployment. to enforce
the Security Council's embargo decision or to
examine the military aspects of restoring peace
with Iraq or to organise the military logistics for
humanitarian aid to the Kurdish refugees.
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77. Everything about WEU's rOle is not yet
clear and, in particular, the question raised by
its links with the institutions of the Twelve has
not yet been answered clearly. The participation
of the WEU secretariat in intergovernmental
activities is still insufficient. However, there is
no doubt that, in this matter, WEU has better
than ever asserted itself as the Western
European military organisation at the service of
the policy of the Twelve.
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